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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes cannibalization as it affects the
Pacific Fleet Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Fleet Replacement
Squadrons. This thesis researches the supply/support posture of
the F/A-18, identifies its shortcomings, analyzes the
cannibalizations performed by the squadrons and determines the
impact and usefulness of cannibalizations. An increase in
cannibalizations increases component failure rates.
Cannibalization doubles maintenance man-hours and depletes
valuable resources. The data showed no clear linear relationship
between cannibalizations and mission capable rate, flight hours
completed, sorties completed or direct maintenance man-hours.
There were many inconsistencies between different data sources.
Cannibalizations should be kept to a minimum. More specific
guidance is needed for cannibalization. A better tracking system
is needed to capture all cannibalization data. Incentives should
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Cannibalization in Naval Aviation refers to the physical
removal of serviceable parts or components from one aircraft for
installation on another aircraft. Cannibalization is widely
recognized among the aviation community as a source of wasted
manpower, yet a necessity in meeting operational commitments.
Operating activities are directed to carefully monitor and
minimize the number of cannibalizations (canns) performed. This
study will focus on the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 aircraft and
the training squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. It will identify
the causes of cannibalizations and determine their impact on
manpower, readiness and asset reliability.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis has five major objectives regarding
cannibalization.
1. To research the supply/support posture of the F/A-18
aircraft to determine the need for squadrons to cannibalize
aircraft parts.
2. To compare the two squadrons studied and draw
conclusions from the comparison.
3. To analyze the number and type of cannibalizations
performed and discover the impact they have on man-hours,
aircraft readiness, and resource availability.
4. To determine if cannibalization is a useful practice or
if its effects are detrimental enough to warrant stricter
controls
.
5. To determine if significant shortages exist in the
current methods of supply and logistics support for the F/A-18
aircraft that contribute to the need for cannibalizations
.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: What is the impact of
cannibalization?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The research focuses on the F/A-18 aircraft. The F/A-18
aircraft has more unfilled/back-ordered initial outfitting
documents than any other aircraft in the Navy and Marine Corps
inventory. An initial outfitting document is the first time an
allowance is authorized for material to support an
aircraft/system. When a document is unfilled/back-ordered, the
material is not available to meet the parts requirement. This is
important because inadequate supply support can lead to increases
in cannibalization. The research is also limited to the two
Pacific Fleet training squadrons for the F/A-18. They are VFA-
125 at NAS Lemoore and VMFAT-101 at MCAS El Toro. Training
squadrons have historically had higher cannibalization rates than
operational squadrons because they are often directed by the Type
Commander (TYCOM) or Wing to cannibalize items for squadrons that
are deploying.
Due to the unavailability of scheduled flight hour data from
VFA-125, the study was unable to examine the relationship between
cannibalization and flight hour completion. The specific cost of
repairables affected could not be determined, to show how
cannibalization impacted the cost of repairables in the system.
Using the F/A-18 as the example for the rest of the aircraft
in the Navy and Marine Corps inventory, the assumption is made
that the actions of the two squadrons chosen are a worst case
scenario as compared to the rest of the fleet. There are several
different sources of data. Only one data source was used
throughout a specific analysis method. The data source is cited
before use.
E. METHODOLOGY
Data was organized separately for the two squadrons,
covering the period from January 1994 to December 1996. Time
series, correlation and regression analysis was performed on the
different sets of data.
The following sources of data were used:
1. Aviation 3M data. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Office
(NAMO) retains complete records on all aircraft. This data was
the primary source for the flight hour data.
2. BD/QQQ data. Data was obtained from Commander Naval Air
Force Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) and Naval Inventory Control
Point (NAVICP)
.
3. Interviews. Personal interviews were held with members
of the squadrons, supply department and comptroller's office.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II of this thesis provides both background on the
F/A-18, including its supply/ support posture, and insight into
why the F/A-18 was chosen for the study. It also describes some
the unique characteristics of the two squadrons. Chapter III is
an overview of the supply and maintenance procedures for the Navy
and Marine Corps. The basic principles of the supply system will
be described along with the policies and procedures for
cannibalization. Chapter IV describes the methodology used in
gathering information and analyzing data. Chapter V presents the
data collected. It contains graphs and tables summarizing the
data. Chapter VI is the analyzes the data collected, including
observations and interpretations. Chapter VII reports the
conclusions and recommendations of the research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW/BACKGROUND
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
To fully understand the rationale and necessity of
cannibalization actions, the authors performed extensive
background research using the following publications: OPNAVINST
4790 (series) , several theses dealing with cannibalization,
articles and micro fiche dealing with cannibalization, Jane's
"All The World's Aircraft", the Internet, a Naval Inventory
Control Point (NAVICP) presentation explaining the budget
process, and a NAVAIR presentation explaining the supportability
and readiness assessment of F/A-18 Fleet Readiness Squadrons.
B . BACKGROUND
In a search for a fighter and attack capable aircraft, the
Navy accepted a combination of F-18 fighter and A-18 attack
aircraft, designated the F/A-18 Hornet. It was manufactured by
McDonnell Douglas with Northrop as a subcontractor. While this
strike fighter aircraft has been flying since 1978, support for
the aircraft is still lacking, specifically spares.
There are numerous versions of the F/A-18. The models
progress from A through F. There are several different lots
within each model, causing further variation. The various
improvements to the F/A-18 allow the aircraft to grow with
technology. However, the numerous type/model/series combined
with the complex avionics, sophisticated design features and
advanced systems on each aircraft complicate its supply support
system.
1. Why Study the F/A-18?
The F/A-18 aircraft has the most models, series, and
configurations of any aircraft in the Naval Aviation inventory.
As mentioned above, this makes the aircraft one of the most
difficult and expensive aircraft to support. As new aircraft are
designed and improved, support issues become more and more
challenging. Engineers have designed many new components that
allow interchangeability from one lot to another. Unfortunately,
interchangeability mainly works from a lower to a higher lot
aircraft. This creates spare shortages for lower lot aircraft.
The tendency is to buy newer, more advanced equipment rather than
expend scarce funds on older items, even though lower lot
aircraft may still need the equipment. This fact becomes
apparent by reviewing the current outstanding initial outfitting
documents in NAVICP' s outstanding document file.
2. Support System
Upon evaluation and analysis of the entire outstanding
initial outfitting documents file, the following tables were
created. Table 1 illustrates the grand totals of all documents
outstanding for all ships, Naval Air Stations and Marine Aviation
Logistics squadrons as of March 1997, for the indicated FY. It
identifies the site with the highest ranges (variety of
requisitions) and depths (total number of requisitions) of
outstanding requirements for that FY. Additionally, it














































Table 1. Unfilled BD/QQQ Documents (Range/Depth)
Table 2 reviews the same period, listing the sites with the
greatest extended money value (EMV) of unfilled initial outfitting
requirements for the indicated FY.
FY Site % Total % Baseload
EMV = F/A-18
92 Sigonella 100% 0%
93 NASNI 30% 0%
China Lake 21% 53.3%
94 NASNI 15% 0%
Mayport 15% 0%
95 MALS-31 29% 100%
MALS-11 25% 87.3%
96 Norfolk 12% 0%
Carl Vinson 11% 28.6%
97 John Stennis 27% 42.9%
Eisenhower 22% 48.7%
Table 2. Unfilled BD/QQQ Documents (EMV)
The above tables identify the most significant initial
outfitting shortages throughout the Pacific and Atlantic fleets.
A supply department' s ability to support its squadrons is based
primarily upon the stock posture of its warehouse. The previous
tables indicate shortages dating back to 1992. There are initial
outfitting documents dating back to the late 1980' s; for the
purpose of this research, only the last 5 years were examined.
Upon review of the tables, it appears that the shortages
alternate between the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. While this
method of alternating deficiencies benefits the applicable sites,
it also masks the problem. By alternating shortages from one
year to the next, the fleet perceives that they are getting
"well" every other year. In reality, the shortage will recur the
following year. This is shown in Table 1 by the alternation
between Pacific and Atlantic activities, but also by the
alternation between F/A-18 sites and non-F/A-18 sites, as
identified in the last column. It is important to understand
this process in order to evaluate potential impacts in other
areas.
3. Supply Support for the F/A-18
While the above tables identify the F/A-18 site deficiencies
versus the entire fleet, a more comprehensive analysis can be
done by breaking down the data into two categories: NASs and
MALS. A more detailed picture of the deficiencies within the
F/A-18 community versus other aircraft at similar land based
sites is provided in Tables 3 .& 4
.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the alternation between the F/A-18
and non-F/A-18 for range and depth deficiencies. Once again,
this masks the deficiencies, and appears to continue. The Marine
sites with F/A-18s have significantly more shortages than Marine

























































































While the outstanding initial outfitting documents can help
determine of current shortages, they are not all inclusive. The
initial outfitting documents are identified by a X QZ' fund code
on the requisition, and the status given to an unfilled QZ
document is BD/QQQ. This status identifies this type of
document. It also provides a method for calculating the number
of QZ documents and evaluating item managers in their ability to
fill their requirements.
5. Reasons for Cannibalization
Comparing the major degraders for the F/A-18 with the
historical list of top five cannibalizations (per month) for a
period of two years, a 33% commonality was found between items
with supply shortages and high cannibalization rates. This
commonality suggests that asset shortages leads to increased
cannibalizations
.
While VMFAT-101 has increasing cannibalization trends; VFAT-
125 's trend is decreasing. These trends may be explained by
either the differences in cannibalization procedures and policies
within each squadron or the personalities within the maintenance
departments during the observed times. It is important to point
out that VMFAT-101 faces higher (slower) supply response times,
meaning that it takes longer for them to receive a part from
supply. Since supply shortages are the most common cause for
11
cannibalizations, it is reasonable to assume that slow delivery
time is partially responsible for the increase in
cannibalizations
.
Even if assets are available at the local supply department,
the time required to deliver the part is often unacceptable to
the squadron. The goal of the supply department is to deliver
high priority parts within one hour of order placement. Aircraft
are usually used for multiple sorties throughout the day. The
turnaround time for the aircraft is often less than one hour.
Parts are cannibalized even when the asset is available and being
delivered within the prescribed time.
Personalities of the maintenance department managers play a
large role in the tendency towards cannibalization. Some
maintenance managers are quicker than others to resort to
cannibalizing parts. All squadrons are under guidance to
minimize cannibalizations. There is not a set goal, and thus
interpretations vary considerably.
12
III. OVERVIEW OF SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
A. SUPPLY PROCESS
1 . Buy-in/buy-out process
The most common explanation for cannibalization is lack of
supply assets. There are many reasons why supply assets are
lacking. The best way to understand these reasons is to
understand the initial and follow on procurement processes. Once
a system is procured, spare assets are also procured to support
the system when parts fail. The requirements determination is
based on the flight hours projected in the Weapons System
Planning Document (WSPD) , baseload document, engineering
estimated failure rates, avionics install plan, maintenance
repair level, the flying hour program and component costs.
Each site's requirements are based on a specific number of
days support and wartime/peacetime hours. The type of site and
its location determine the range and depth of assets procured for
that site. An aircraft carrier or Marine Air Group (MAG) is
outfitted for 90 days support using wartime hours; while an
overseas Naval Air Station (OCONUS) is outfitted for 60 days
support using wartime hours; and a CONUS Naval Air Station (NAS)
is outfitted for 30 days support using peacetime hours.
Retail site outfittings, Fleet Industrial Supply Centers
(FISCs) , are determined differently than squadron supply
departments. The weapons system baseload is one of the
13
supporting data sources. Also included are the procurement
quantities, delivery schedules, site activations or buildups,
deployment schedules, and supply support scenarios. The retail
sites need to stock the proper supplies to fill the order/reorder
requirements of the NASs/MALS.
Another important consideration is the system cost sheets.
The cost sheets contain the aircraft flyaway cost and the
system/ component costs. If an asset cost is extremely high, it
is likely that the depth and possibly the range of allowances for
that asset will be very low. Since the F/A-18 is one of the more
expensive aircraft in the inventory, understanding cost
constraints in allowancing methodologies is important.
The NAS/MALS is not only outfitted with spare parts support,
but also has requirements for test bench installations (TBIs)
,
maintenance assist modules (MAMs) , and complete engine repair
(CER) . Each of these requirements will have additional parts
requirements. TBIs need weapons replacement assemblies (WRAs)
for the test bench, and often additional requirements based on
engineering specifications. MAMs need to have SRAs for fault
isolation. Finally, CER reduces spare engine TAT/investment, but
it requires major engine repair capability at individual sites.
This is a costly investment.
In addition to the NAS/MAG/CV support requirements addressed
earlier, additional support packages are built into the user'
s
support allowances. Marines use a Contingency Support Package
14
(CSP) which is built for 90 days using wartime hours. It is an
I-level support package equal to a CV/MAG computation and based
on aircraft numbers identified in baseloads. This package
supports deployment requirements where the aircraft will need
support but will be geographically separated from their home
base.
The Navy uses a Supplemental Aviation Spares Support (SASS)
package. This is an O-level support package, and is built to
specified support levels for a pre-determined number of aircraft.
This package is also used to support the aircraft while they are
away from their home base. ' SASS packages must maintain high
range and depth levels for these assets to effectively support
the squadrons while on deployment. These assets are above and
beyond the core support required for the aircraft. These assets
are normally used to support home guard aircraft on deployment.
An FRS will not normally have access to SASS material, limiting
its access to spares support.
In addition to the known requirements, there are often
unanticipated upgrade and configuration changes. This creates
special support requirements. This is not baseload driven, and
can vary dramatically from program to program. Further
considerations must be given to common avionics systems,
modifications, and support equipment. Since deploying squadrons
normally take the same types/lots of aircraft, the FRSs usually




The bottom line is that there are many parts requirements
and limited resources to obtain them. There are several
considerations in obligating funds for material. Even after
making the obligation, funding deficiencies are still an issue.
2 . How Funding Deficiencies are Handled
When a system is procured and requirements determined, only
85% of the total financial requirement is funded. Before the
parts are even ordered, the program is already 15% short of its
requirements. The item managers at NAVTCP-Philadelphia are
directed to establish contracts for all (100%) system
requirements knowing that there 15% funding shortfall. This
initial phase of procurement is called the buy-in phase. During
this time, item managers research and develop the contracts
necessary for needed material. This phase can last up to two
years.
The next phase is the buy-out phase. In this phase,
contractors develop capabilities to obtain the needed assets
under contract or look for sub-contractors to meet the contract
terms. Contractors are normally given up to two years to begin
filling the requirements. The entire buy-in/buy-out process,
from the initial customer requirement until it is filled, can
take up to four years. The duration of the buy-in/buy-out phase
may leave deficiencies in aircraft support, which creates an
16
environment where cannibalization is the most viable alternative.
NAVICP budgeteers operate knowing that there will be a
shortfall of 15%, and plan on finding a way to fill the deficit
prior to incurring financial obligation. To do this, they must
re-allocate or shift funds as requirements become available.
This process is referred to as churn.
3. Effects of Churn
Since funds are not obligated until the asset is
received/issued, back-ordered assets are frequently canceled and
the funding reallocated to pay for available material. This type
of churn creates a continuous funding deficit that is merely
shifted from one contract to another. This creates material
shortfalls. The initial funding shortfalls ultimately lead to
asset shortages. Until this practice is changed, the supply
system can not support all material requirements.
B. CANNIBALIZATION PRACTICES AND POLICIES
Work-arounds to material deficiencies are created to
continue flying the required missions and keeping mission
capability rates at acceptable levels. Cannibalizations are an
often utilized work-around. If there is a requirement for an
asset, and the material is not readily available through the
local supply department, the squadron will often consider
cannibalizing the asset from an already down aircraft, shifting
the requirement to that aircraft. This will keep the same number
17
of requirements, but will allow them to have more FMC/MC
aircraft. While it gives the squadron a higher full
mission/mission capability rate, cannibalizations can dilute the
sense of urgency associated with procuring the component because
the squadron maintains a higher mission capability rate; it is
then out of the spotlight. Cannibalization, at a minimum, doubles
the maintenance man-hours for the single requirement. The
maintainer is also faced with the possibility of breaking the
working component through the maintenance action, thereby
increasing the parts requirement. Constant cannibalization of a
single aircraft often degrades an aircraft to a Special Interest
Aircraft (SPINTAC) . SPINTAC aircraft are those that have not
flown for 60 consecutive days.
In the late 1970' s, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized
the wasted man-hours involved in cannibalization. He directed
all aircraft squadrons to reduce cannibalization. Cannibalization
has remained an important issue in aircraft maintenance.
OPNAVINST 4790. 2F states that "cannibalization with few
exceptions, is a manifestation of a logistic or maintenance
support system failure." It further states that cannibalization
reduces morale and worsens NMCS/PMCS situations. Commands are
directed to keep cannibalizations to a minimum. Measurement
criteria for effective cannibalization include cannibalizations
per 100 flight hours and cannibalization maintenance man-hours
per month.
18
Like all maintenance actions, cannibalizations are
documented on a maintenance action form(MAF). This documentation
helps monitor cannibalization actions. Cannibalization actions
are identified by their malfunction code. At the organizational
level, the Maintenance Material control Of ficer (MMCO) establishes
procedures for controlling cannibalization. (OPNAVINST 4790. 2F)
There are some systems which require special instructions for
cannibalization. Egress system components cannibalization is
specifically directed to be minimized. Cannibalization of egress
systems exposes maintenance personnel to unnecessarily hazardous
repair procedures. Logbook entries are required when removing
this type of equipment, as well as aircraft engines. Reducing
cannibalizations will reduce the possibility of administrative
error.
Both squadrons in this study have published their own
Maintenance Instructions (MI) for cannibalizations. For each
squadron, the instructions amplify the instructions written by
their wing commanders and the guidance provided in OPNAVINST
4790. 2F. Each squadron has provided their own view on handling
cannibalization.
The stated goals of VFA-125 in reducing cannibalization
reflect the broader objectives of asset management and system
discipline. They are:




2. Rigid adherence to proper troubleshooting techniques and
utilization of prescribed test equipment.
3. Strict compliance with Maintenance Instruction Manuals
(MIM's) and Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRC's).
4. Conscientious observance of material handling/packaging
requirements
.
The VFA-125 MI policy states the procedures for
cannibalizing parts from aircraft that are in SPINTAC status or
out of readiness reporting. Permission from the wing is
required. Prior to cannibalizing, the work center is required to
perform thorough fault isolation, order a replacement part and
turn in the unserviceable part. Maintenance/Material Control
will determine if the supply status and part delivery time is
adequate
.
VMFAT-101's MI states many of the same themes of VFA-125 's
MI. The VMFAT-101 MI is combined with the SPINTAC instruction.
In the discussion section it recognizes the increased man-hours
incurred from cannibalization and the increased possibility of
SPINTAC. It instructs the Maintenance Material control
supervisor to interface with the supply department to minimize
supply response times. It states that cannibalization should not
be performed solely to avoid SPINTAC status. It instructs work
center supervisors not to cannibalize without permission from
Maintenance Control. As in the VFA-125 MI, cannibalization may
only occur after the part is on order and the supply system has
20
had sufficient time to respond. The MI also states that
cannibalization should not be used to improve FMC statistics.
If followed properly, the instructions presented above could
prevent unnecessary cannibalizations . However, experience
indicates procedures are not always followed when time is scarce
and there is pressure to launch an aircraft. It is the
responsibility of the Quality Assurance/Analysis Division to
monitor cannibalization rates and trends. Often times the
cannibalization numbers are recorded on the 3M summary, and then
simply forgotten.
OPNAVINST 4790. 2F states that when cannibalizations are
managed properly it is a viable management tool. Policies should
be flexible in nature. Both squadrons have very flexible Mi's.
Basically, it is up to the cognizant maintenance manager to
select appropriate cannibalization opportunities. Without proper
emphasis from the AMO, reiterating the principles in the
cannibalization instructions, it would be easy to over use
cannibalization as a quick fix to an immediate problem. The
broader problems of supply response time, proper troubleshooting





Although no formal interviews were conducted, several
conversations with personnel from each of the squadrons and
supporting commands provided valuable information on
cannibalization and supply system policies and practices. At NAS
Lemoore, the researchers spoke to squadron personnel in both
Maintenance Control, the work centers, the data analyst, and the
AMO. Topside representatives ranged from personnel in the
Operations Department to the Commanding Officer. Information was
also obtained from personnel in the Aviation Support Division.
For information on VMFAT-101, the researchers visited MALS-
11, which is the squadron's supporting unit. MALS-11 provides
intermediate maintenance and supply support for the squadron.
Squadron personnel, to include the AMO and AAMO were also
consulted for data and information.
B . DATA
There were two different uses for data. The data used in
time-series analysis and linear regression was obtained from the
squadron. Data was arranged in a spreadsheet to perform the
necessary analysis. The data fields included the following for
each month of the time period:
1. Cannibalization maintenance man-hours (Cann MMH)
2. Direct maintenance man-hours (DMMH)
23
3 Cannibalizations per 100 flight hours (Cann/IOOFH;
4. Flight hours (FH)
5. Mission capable rates (MC)
6. Sorties
7. Total number of cannibalizations (Total canns)
8. Direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour
Data for VFA-125 was taken directly from the 3M summaries,
published by the squadron. Maintenance data for VMFAT-101 was
obtained from the squadron. Flight information was extracted
from the NAMO data base. BD/QQQ information was obtained from
CNAP/NAVICP. Data used in analyzing the types and number of
cannibalizations from 1994 through 1996 was extracted from the






All data fields collected were plotted against time to
identify any seasonal or cyclical patterns and to compare the
squadrons against one another. Further analysis was performed on
areas of interest.
2 . Regression Analysis
Several variations of single and multiple regression
analysis were performed to examine the linear relationship
between cannibalizations and sorties, mission capability rates,
direct maintenance man-hours, flight hours and cannibalization
24
maintenance man-hours. For each regression performed the
regression parameters, their standard deviations as well as the
t-ratios, p-values, R-squared and F statistic were calculated
using the Minitab statistical program.
The general regression equation is Y = b + m]_X]_ + 1112X2 +
. . .m^X^, where Y is the response variable and the X variables are
the predictor variables. The constant b is the y- intercept. The
m variables are the regression parameters/coefficients.
The t-ratio, p-values, R-squared and F statistic all help
explain the relationship between the variables. All tests were
performed at the 95 percent confidence level. The t-ratio is the
ratio of the parameter estimates over their standard deviations.
If the t-ratio is large enough for the applicable degrees of
freedom, than there is a statistically significant linear
relationship between the variables in the regression equation.
The degrees of freedom for a t-distribution are derived by n-2
for simple regression and n-k-1 for multiple regression where n
is the number of observations and k is the number of parameters.
The values for the t-test were extracted from standard t-
distribution tables.
The F statistic is related to and analyzed in the same
manner as the t-ratio. In simple regression, it is the square of
the t-ratio. In multiple regression the F test essentially
combines the individual t tests into one test. It is a more
reliable test in multiple regression because it is not affected
25
by colinearity.
The p-value is another indicator of the strength of the
linear relationship between the variables in the equation. It is
the probability of getting a value at least as extreme as the
outcome observed. The smaller the p-value, the stronger the
evidence of a significant relationship between variables. A p-
value of less than .05 is considered strong evidence.
The correlation coefficients, R-squared and R-squared
adjusted for degrees of freedom, are useful in analyzing the
variability in the regression equation. The r-squared value is
the percentage of the variability of Y that is explained by the
variability in X. In multiple regression, the value is the
percentage of variability in Y that is explained by the
variability of the combination of the X variables.
3. Cost Analysis
To determine a cannibalization maintenance cost, $50 per
maintenance man-hour was multiplied by the total number of
cannibalization maintenance man-hours. The man-hours that were
calculated are the man-hours required to remove and replace an
item. These man-hours would not normally be required if the part
was received from the supply system.
4. Failure Rate Analysis
NAVICP provided the original engineering estimates, and
current Maintenance Replacement Factor (MRF) and Rotable Pool
26
Factor (RPF) for the twelve work unit code's representing the






Table 5 is a broad look at the squadrons studied. The
figures in the tables are the averages per month over the two
year period for January 1995 to December 1996. Currently VFA-125
has 406 maintenance personnel and VMFAT-101 has 312. Both
squadrons are assigned fewer personnel than they are authorized.




# Aircraft 41 32
Cann man-hours 688.8 479.1
Total man-hours 16, 619.0 10,304.3
DMMH per FH 12.7 7.8
Canns per 100 FH 10.9 3.8
Flight Hours 1,329.7 1,330.3
Sorties completed 1053.4 1005.4
Mission capable rate 57.5 83.8
Table 5. Overview of Squadron Statistics
B. BASIC TRENDS
1 . Cannibalizations
Cannibalizations are generally measured as the total number
of items that were cannibalized per month, or as the number of
cannibalizations per 100 flight hours for that month. Both of
29
these measures are considered here. Figure 1 illustrates the
total number of cannibalizations per month for each of the two
squadrons. Figure 2 shows the squadron comparison of
cannibalizations per 100 flight hours. VFA-125 consistently
reported a more cannibalizations. In both measures of
cannibalization, there appears to be no cyclical or seasonal
trend.
Probably the most important consideration when dealing with
cannibalizations is the man-hours involved. Figures 3 and 4
compare cannibalization man-hours versus total maintenance man-
hours for each squadron. The number on the top of each bar
indicates the percentage of cannibalization man-hours. The
percentage for VMFAT-101 ranges from one to 15 percent; while the
range for VFA-125 is one to five percent. VMFAT-101 consistently
reports fewer total man-hours than VFA-125.
30
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Flight operations are an important consideration when
comparing cannibalizations . Figure 5a is a line representation
of squadron flight hours. Figure 5b shows the same information
in an area chart for easier volume comparisons. In some months
the number of flight hours in each squadron is quite different,
but the overall averages for the two year period are almost
identical. The average for VFA-125 is 1329.7 hours and the
average for VMFAT-101 is 1330.3 hours.
Figure 6a and 6b are similar to flight hour charts, but show
sorties generation data. Sorties are similar for the two
squadrons, except for the months of February and August. The
averages are slightly different for the two year period. VFA-125
has an average of 1053.4 while VMFAT-101 has an average of
1005.4. The calculated average flight time for VFA-125 is 1.2 6
hours; it is slightly higher for VMFAT-101 at 1.32.
3. Mission Capable Rates
The mission capable rates for each squadron are displayed in
Figure 7. The rates reported by VMFAT-101 are considerably
higher than those of VFA-125. The two year average for VFA-125

























































































































































The correlation between the variables in our study are shown
in Table 6. The number in each box is the correlation
coefficient of the two variables connected to that box. The
highest correlation specifically related to cannibalizations was
the correlation between cannibalizations per 100 flight hour and
sorties flown for VMFAT-101 at -.615. This is a negative
















Ttl Canns -.018 -.161 .794 .705 .110 .144
FH .190 .831 -.565 -.102 .483 -.172
Sort Flwn .122 .933 -.615 -.172 .401 -.190
Cann/100 .876 -.291 -.348 .582 -.220 .111
Cann MMH .464 .160 .331 .307 .175 .252
Ttl MMH .421 .524 .491 .171 .337 -.232
MC -.091 .456 .458 -.266 -.148 .095
Table 6. Correlation Factors Between Variables
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2. Linear Regression
Summaries of the regression results are presented in Figures
8 and 9. Columns represent the response variables and rows
represent the predictor variables. The t-ratio for each
coefficient is below the coefficient in parenthesis. More
detailed outputs, including Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tables
are presented in Figures 10 through 29. The criteria for the t-
ratio and F statistic for the regression equations was obtained
from the distribution tables. A t-ratio greater than 1.717 and
an F statistic greater than 4.3 are evidence of a linear
relationship between the variables X and Y for the single
regression equations. Only two regression equations met the
criteria for the t-ratio, F statistic and p-value. They were
both for VFA-125. The lines were cannibalizations per 100 flight
hour as the independent variable and both sorties and
cannibalizations maintenance man-hours as the dependent
variables. The R-squared values for these lines were 37.1% for
sorties and 33.9% for cannibalization maintenance man-hours.
The criteria for the F statistic for the multiple regression
equations was 3.47 for two predictor variables and 3.10 for three
predictor variables. For both squadrons, the regression equation
with sorties as the response variable and cannibalizations per
100 flight hour and cannibalization maintenance man-hours as the
predictor variables met the test criteria. The R-squared values
42
were 42.6% for VFA-125 and 33.4% for VMFAT-101. When the
variable direct maintenance man-hours was added to the multiple
regression equation, evidence of a relationship still existed and
the R-squared values for both squadrons increased. The same
predictor variables did not show strong evidence of a
relationship with mission capable rates.






























































Figure 8. Summary of Simple Regressions
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Figure 9. Summary of Multiple Regressions
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The regression equation is
Sorties = 1525 - 43.1 Cann/IOOFH
Predictor Coef Stdev t--ratio P
Constant 1525.3 138. 7 11.00 0.000
Cann/IOOFH -43.1 12. -3.60 0.002
s = 224.5 R-sq = 37.11 R-sq(adj) == 34.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 654926 654926 12.99 0.002
Error 22 1109160 50416
Total 23 1764086
Figure 10. VFA-125 Regression Results. Sorties Flown: Cann/IOOFH
The regression equation is
Sorties = 1189 -- 48.7 Cann/IOOFH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 1188.8 109.4 10.87 0.000
Cann/IOOFH -48.66 27.83 -1.75 0.094
s - 151.6 R-sq = 12.2% R-sq(adj) ;= 8 . 2 ~6
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 70229 70229 3.06 0.094
Error 22 505644 22984
Total 23 575874
Figure 11. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. Sorties Flown:
Cann/IOOFH
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The regression equation is
MC = 55.6 +.172 Cann/IOOFH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 55.609 3.806 14.61 0.000
Cann/IOOFH 0.172 0.328 0.52 0.605

















Figure 12. VFA-125 Regression Results. MC: Cann/IOOFH
The regression equation is




























Figure 13. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. MC : Cann/IOOFH
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The regression equation is



































Figure 14. VFA-125 Regression Results. FH: Total Canns
The regression equation is



































Figure 15. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. FH: Total Canns
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The regression equation is
Cann MMH = 301 + 35.4 Cann/100 FH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 301.1 122.2 2.46 0.022
10.54 3.36Cann/100 FH 35.40 0.003






SS MS F p
441561 441561 11.28 0.003
861210 39146
1302770
Figure 16. VFA-125 Regression Results. Cann MMH: Cann/100 FH
The regression equation is
Cann MMH = 91 + 103 Cann/100 FH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 91.3 267.2 0.34 0.736
Cann/100 FH 102.92 68.01 1.51 0.144
s = 370.4 R-sq = 9.4% R-sq(adj) = 5.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 314213 314213 2.29 0.144
Error 22 3019113 137232
Total 23 3333325
Figure 17. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. Cann MMH: Cann/100 FH
48
The regression equation is























Figure 18. VFA-125 Regression Results. DMMH: Cann/IOOFH
The regression equation is








R-sq(adj) = 0.0 !
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 2614263 2614263




Figure 19. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. DMMH: Cann/100 FH
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The regression equation is
DMMH = 15393 + 1.7 8 Cann MMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 15393 1551 9.93 0.000
Cann MMH 1.781 2.133 0.83 0.413















Figure 20. VFA-125 Regression Results. DMMH: Cann MMH
The regression equation is






























Figure 21. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. DMMH: Cann MMH
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The regression equation is
MC = 53.4 - 0.083 Cann/100 FH + .00721 Cann MMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 53.440 4. 280 12.49 0.000
Cann/100 FH -0.0831 0. 4019 -0.21 0.838
Cann MMH 0.007205 0. 006609 1.09 0.288
s = 6.133 R-sq - 6.5% R-sq(adj) = 0.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 55.13 27.56 0.73 0.492
Error 21 790.01 37.62
Total 23 845.14
Cann/100 FH 1 10.42
Cann MMH 1 44.71
Figure 22. VFA-125 Regression Results. MC: Cann/100 FH, Cann MMH
The regression equation is
MC - 87.2 - 0.804 Cann/100 FH - .00073 Cann MMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 87.196 2. 733 31.90 0.000
Cann/100 FH -0.8041 0. 7291 -1.10 0.283
Cann MMH -0.000728 0. 002175 -0.33 0.741
s = 3.779 R-sq = 7.6% ]R.-sq(adj) = 0.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 24.52 12.26 0.86 0.438
Error 21 299.95 14.28
Total 23 324.47
Cann/100 FH 1 22.92
Cann MMH 1 1.60
Figure 23. VMFAT-101 Regression Results. MC: Cann/IOOFH, Cann MMH
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The regression equation is




































Figure 24. VFA-125 Regression Results
Cann MMH
Sorties: Cann/IOOFH,
The regression equation is
Sorties Flown = 1170 - 69.4 Cann/100 FH + . 2 01 Cann MMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 1170.44 97 .72 11.98 0.000
Cann/100 FH -69.37 26 .07 -2.66 0.015
Cann MMH 0.20126 .07776 2.59 0.017
s = 135.1 R-sq - 33.4% R-sq (adj) == 27.1%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 2 192518 96259 5.27 0.014
Error 21 383356 18255
Total 23 575874
Cann/100 FH 1 70229
Cann MMH 1 122289




The regression equation is
MC = 68.6 - 0.356 Cann/100 FH + .0114 Cann MMH -0.000906 DMMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 68.58 10. 32 6.65 0.000
Cann/100 FH -0.3559 0. 4235 -0.84 0.411
Cann MMH 0.011432 0. 006900 1.66 0.113
DMMH -0.0009065 0. 000566 -1.60 0.125
s = 5.917 R-sq = 17.2% ]R-sq(adj) == 4.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 144.94 48.31 1.38 0.278
Error 20 700.20 35.01
Total 23 845.14
Cann/100 FH 1 10.42
Cann MMH 1 44.71
DMMH 1 89.81
Figure 26. VFA-125 Regression Results
DMMH
MC: Cann/IOOFH, Cann MMH,
The regression equation is
MC = 84.1 - 0.848 Cann/100 FH - .00130 Cann MMH +0.000346 DMMH
•
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 84.073 4. 736 17.75 0.000
Cann/100 FH -0.8482 0. 7371 -1.15 0.263
Cann MMH -0.001296 0. 002302 -0.56 0.580
DMMH 0.0003456 0. 0004262 0.81 0.427
s = 3.811 R-sq = 10.5% R-sq(adj) = 0.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 3 34.07 11.36 0.78 .518
Error 20 290.40 14.52
Total 23 324.47
Cann/100 FH 1 22.92
Cann MMH 1 1.60
DMMH 1 9.54




The regression equation is
Sorties Flown = 993 - 47.2 Cann/100 FH + 0.213 Cann MMH + 0.0251
DMMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 993.3 378.0 2.63 0.016
Cann/100 FH -47.16 15.52 -3.04 0.006
Cann MMH 0.2135 0.2529 0.84 0.409
DMMH 0.02583 0.02074 1.25 0.227
s = 216.8 R-sq = 46.7% R-sq(adj) = 38.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 823904 274635 5.84 0.005
Error 20 940181 47009
Total 23 1764086
Cann/100 FH 1 654926
Cann MMH 1 96030
DMMH 1 72948
Figure 28. VFA-125 Regression Results. Sorties: Cann/IOOFH,
Cann MMH, DMMH
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The regression equation is
Sorties Flown = 834 - 74.1 Cann/100 FH + 0.140 Cann MMH + 0.0373
DMMH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 833.7 145.0 5.75 0.000
Cann/100 FH -74.13 22.58 -3.28 0.004
Cann MMH 0.14005 0.07050 1.99 0.061
DMMH 0.03726 0.01305 2.85 0.010
s = 116.7 R-sq = 52.7% R-sq(adj) = 45.6%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 303495 101165 7.43 0.002
Error 20 272379 13619
Total 23 575874
Cann/100 FH 1 70229
Cann MMH 1 122289
DMMH 1 110977






. Top Fourteen Items Cannibalized
The following analysis was done over a period of three years
instead of two as in the previous analysis. The data was
extracted from the Aviation 3M database. The top fourteen
cannibalized items for both squadrons combined are presented in
Table 7. The list was compiled by combining the top ten lists
for each squadron.













2740000 F404-GE engine 50 118 43 125 65 94
1461210 TE Flap hyd servo
cylinder
23 51 46 113 46 74
742G100 T1377/APG65 radar
transmitter
10 74 14 80 10 39
1431210 horiz stabilizer
hyd servo cylinder
29 74 20 63 39 46
742G200 R2089/APG65 radar
rxvr transmitter
10 61 12 53 9 43
742G600 AS3254/APG65
antenna
49 72 17 55 16 13
1421110 aileron 25 26 15 30 9 37
1441210 rudder hyd servo
cylinder
2 33 4 53 10 20
1421210 ail activating hyd
servo cylinder
5 29 6 28 6 36
57D9100 CP1330 () /ASW44
roll pitch yaw
2 19 4 40 7 34
74D6100 AN/AVQ2 8 head-up
display unit




5 17 46 32 28 8
741P400 CP1699/AYK14 (v)
digital data cr
16 27 18 13 4 7
62X2100 RT1250O/ARC radio
receiver xmtr
13 4 13 2 8
Table 7. The Top Fourteen Items Cannibalized
Figures 30 and 31 illustrate the frequency of the top three
cannibalized items for each squadron over a three year period.
In each of the cases for VFA-125 cannibalizations peaked in 1995
and dropped in 1996. There was no significant pattern for the
top three items for VMFAT-101.
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2 . Failure Rates
The failure rates for 12 of the top 14 cannibalized items
are presented in Table 8. The original Maintenance Replacement
Factor (MRF) is shown along with the original Rotable Pool Factor
(RPF) . Failure rates are calculated by adding the MRF and RPF.
The current failure rate is compared to the previous failure and
original failure rates to determine whether the rate is





















1421110 .009 .044 .037 .081 .048 .020 .068 Dec
1421210 .009 .035 .009 .043 .052 .003 .069 .072 Inc
1431210 .122 .060 .110 .170 .056 .137 .193 Inc
1441210 .027 .039 .027 .046 .073 .009 .077 .086 Inc
1461210 .005 .075 .105 .180 .043 .142 .185 Inc
57D9100 .026 .006 .238 .244 .009 .243 .256 Inc
741P400 .028 .006 .325 .331 .000 .383 .383 Inc
742G100 .010 .477 .009 .835 .844 .010 .617 .627 Inc
742G200 .010 .573 .011 .565 .576 .010 .569 .579 Dec
742G600 .004 .184 .013 .617 .630 .006 .390 .396 Inc
7468100 .023 .467 .023 .467 .490 .017 .516 .533 Inc
62X2100 .112 .002 .203 .205 .003 .239 .242 Inc




The cost of cannibalizations are reflected in the material
costs of parts that are damaged or worn out prematurely due to
frequent maintenance, and the man-hour costs of performing
repetitive maintenance. Removing and replacing parts twice for
cannibalization increases maintenance man-hours. The costs of
the extra man-hours in each squadron are summarized in Table 9.
VMFAT-101 VFA-125
Month FY95 FY96 FY95 FY96
Jan $16, 810 $13, 650 $46,700 $36,300
Feb 9,385 19,415 51,350 35,100
Mar 11,050 24,730 35,105 23,200
Apr 38,250 8,860 30,720 42,050
May 29, 095 10, 660 30, 635 11, 650
June 31, 685 27,000 61,105 18,250
July 35,880 16,485 34,445 27,800
Aug 97,085 18,510 23,700 44, 650
Sept 17,350 6,725 35,850 32,200
Oct 17, 055 20,700 27,850 34,400
Nov 52, 605 25,970 47,350 32,750
Dec 16,910 9,030 49,065 14,100
Total $373,160 $201,735 $473,875 $352,450
Table 9. Man Hour Costs of Cannibalization Per Month
F. DOCUMENTATION
There were many inconsistencies in the data collected. Data
from VFA-125 3M Summary reports varied significantly from the
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data in NALDA database at COMNAVAIRPAC . The variance between the
two data sets is plotted in Figure 30. This data also differed
from the data extracted from the cannibalization log book
maintained by VFA-125. The patterns of the variance was random.
There was no consistency in which source of information would
produce the higher number. The data received from VMFAT-101 was
very close to the data extracted form the database. Rounding























































Figure 32. The Difference Between VFA-125 3M Summary Data and
NALDA Data reported for the Number of Cannibalizations Per Month
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VI. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. DATA COMPARISON
1. Cannibalizations
The difference in flight hours per month per activity is
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the cannibalizations per
100 flight hours reflect the same ratio as the cannibalization
trend. The maintenance instructions for cannibalizations for each
activity do not contain any significant differences that would
explain the variation in cannibalizations between the squadrons.
Interviews with the maintenance personnel at each facility did
not explain the disparity in cannibalization occurrences.
However, after reviewing the allowances at the two activities,
VMFAT-101's supply support activity has markedly higher
allowances for the high demand/ frequently cannibalized items than
does VFA-125. Higher allowances do not always mean more material
is available. However, this notable difference between the two
activities could explain the lower cannibalization percentage if
material is on hand to support the allowances.
Although the total cannibalizations are much lower for
VMFAT-101, the cannibalization man-hours as a percentage of total
man-hours is generally higher than those of VFA-125. This
presumably reflects the lower total man-hours reported by VMFAT-
101. A difference in total man-hours is expected because of the
difference in the number of personnel. However, the magnitude of
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the difference is not proportional to the difference in
personnel. An explanation for the large disparity is different
documentation procedures. The documentation requirements are the
same for both squadrons. However, in practice, the
interpretations could be quite different.
There are inconsistencies in the data obtained from
different sources for the same time period for each squadron.
The cause of these discrepancies is largely unknown. Although
the researchers did not investigate the data further, unprocessed
or rejected AV3M data or creative reporting procedures within the
organizations could lead to these inconsistencies.
2. Flight Hours/Sorties
As mentioned, flight hours between the activities are
virtually the same. This suggests that the operations tempos at
the two activities are relatively similar. Comparing the sorties
provided similar results. Since the number of sorties is over
1000 per month, the difference is minor (less than 5%) and does
not explain the difference in cannibalizations/maintenance
requirements per month.
3. Mission Capability (MC) Rates
The difference in MC rates between the two squadrons is
significant. One explanation of the higher MC rates for VMFAT-
101 is that the aircraft in the squadron are reported in a
mission capable status during scheduled maintenance. During
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scheduled -maintenance, the aircraft may require maintenance that
in another situation would require the aircraft be reported not
mission capable. Always reporting an aircraft mission capable
during this type of maintenance could skew MC rates for the
squadron. Research did not produce such a finding for VFA-125,
which could explain the drastic difference in MC rates.
B. CORRELATION
The correlation coefficients in Table 6 produced interesting
results. It was expected that sorties would increase flight
hours; a strong positive correlation was anticipated. While
total cannibalizations versus flight hours and total
cannibalizations versus MC rate had low correlations, this does
not discount the relationships. Cannibalizations are a minor
part of the daily maintenance requirements, and their relational
impact is actually several layers removed from the end product.
For example:
MC = up time/total time
Up time = 1 - down time (DT)
DT = NMCS + NMCM + PMCS + PMCM.
Each of the sub components of DT involve various types of
maintenance, including cannibalization requirements.
The correlation results display a myriad of relationships,
positive and negative, weak and strong. Approximately 43% of the
data for VFA-125 possesses greater than a 25% linear
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relationship, while approximately 67% of the data for VMFAT-101
possesses greater than a 25% linear relationship.
C. LINEAR REGRESSION
Several versions of single and multiple regression analysis
were performed on the data sets. Figure 8 shows that the linear
relationships in the between the data are not very strong. The
regression equation from VFA-125 indicated that cannibalizations
per 100 flight hour have a negative impact on the number of
sorties flown and a positive impact on cannibalization
maintenance man-hours. 37.1% of the variability in sorties is
described by the variability in cannibalizations per 100 flight
hour. 33.9% of the variation in cannibalization maintenance man-
hours is explained by the variability in cannibalizations per 100
flight hour.
The R-squared values for all of the regression equations are
not very close to 100%. This, means that there are other causes
for the variation in the response variable besides the variation
in the predictor variables used above. This is expected, because
there are many factors that influence mission capability rates,
flight hours, sorties, etc.... They include factors that are not
maintenance related such as budget and flight hour allowances,
personnel changes and differences in reporting procedures.
Multiple regression analysis was used to explain more of the
variability in sorties and mission capability.
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The test criteria for all the different combinations of
multiple regression on mission capability were not met. There is
not significant evidence that cannibalizations per 100 flight
hour combined with any of the other variables have a significant
relationship with mission capability. This result is unexpected,
since mission capability is a function of aircraft "up" time
compared to "down" time. The various maintenance factors were
expected to have a large impact on the mission capability rates.
An explanation for the lack of a significant relationship is the
flexibility afforded squadrons in reporting mission capable
rates. If mission capability data is somewhat random, there
would not be a strong relationship between the variables.
The multiple regression equations with sorties as the
response variable produced the expected results. As more
variables were added to the equation, the R-squared value
increased. The additional predictor variables helped explain the
variability in the response variable. Figures 24, ,25, 28 and 29
show that a significant relationship exists between sorties and
the combination of cannibalizations per 100 flight hour,
cannibalization maintenance man-hours and direct maintenance man-
hours. Cannibalizations per 100 flight hour has a negative
relationship with sorties. Cannibalization maintenance man-hours
and direct maintenance man-hours have a positive relationship
with sorties flown.
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D. FAILURE RATE ANALYSIS
In Table 8, where failure rates are listed, in the cases
where the original RPF was unavailable, the previous failure rate
was compared with the current failure rate. Where original MRF
and RPF was available, the original estimate was compared to the
previous and current failure rates to determine if the item's
failure rate was increasing or decreasing.
In all but two cases, failure rates are increasing (though
in two of the increasing cases there is a decrease between the
previous and current failure rates) . This means that the
components are failing more frequently than estimated. Nine of
these items have not only increased from original estimates, but
have continued to increase over previously calculated failure
rates. These components represent twelve of the fourteen highest
cannibalized items at the Pacific Fleet FRS's. Data for the
remaining two items were not available.
E. CANNIBALIZATION COSTS
Table 9 displays the financial impact associated with
cannibalizations . Since a cannibalization maintenance action
would not normally be performed if the material was readily
available, these are additional maintenance costs that are
absorbed in the normal maintenance budget.
VFA-125 expended $826,325 due to cannibalization maintenance
man-hours while VMFAT-101 expended $574,895 for cannibalization
70
maintenance man-hours over the same two year period. These
figures are labor cost and do not include the additional parts
and material cost. The man-hours used in cannibalization are
duplicate man-hours. The part must be removed and replaced twice
by the time the cannibalized aircraft is restored. In the
current atmosphere of down-sizing and budget shortages this is a
large source of waste.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OBJECTIVES
This thesis analyzed cannibalization as it effects the
Pacific Fleet Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Fleet Replacement
Squadrons. The objectives of this thesis were to research the
F/A-18 supply/support posture, compare two squadrons, analyze the
number and type of canns performed, determine if cannibalization
is a useful practice and identify if significant shortages exist
in the supply support system.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following are the conclusions of this research:
1. Shortages in the supply system and slow supply response
times are a major cause of cannibalizations
.
2. An increase in cannibalizations causes an increase in
component failure rates.
3. Cannibalization causes repetitive maintenance and it has
a high opportunity cost. It depletes resources used for other
maintenance/activities
.
4. An increase in cannibalizations per 100 flight hours has
a negative impact on sorties completed.
5. The research did not find a significant linear
relationship between cannibalizations and mission capable rate,
flight hours completed, and direct maintenance man-hours.
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6. There were many inconsistencies between the different
data sources.
7. The reliance on manual tracking systems is inadequate in
capturing cannibalization data.
8. There is a difference in the maintenance practices and
reporting policies between the squadrons.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations from this research:
1. Improvements are needed in the aviation supply system.
Material requirements need 100% funding. The buy-in/buy-out
process needs to be condensed to meet material requirements more
rapidly. Initial outfitting documents need to be funded and
filled more expeditiously.
2. Cannibalizations should be minimized and only used to
meet critical mission requirements. Cannibalizations should not
be used to avoid SPINTAC situations nor to increase readiness.
3. A better tracking system is needed to capture
cannibalization data. Manual tracking systems for
cannibalizations are redundant and should be eliminated to avoid
documentation disparities.
4. Incentives should be incorporated to encourage accurate
maintenance reporting. During assist visits from wing and type
commanders squadron records should be audited and compared
against actual practices. The results should be part of the
74
criteria for squadron awards and individual evaluations instead
of mission capability rates.
5. More specific guidance is needed for cannibalization. A
checklist including time lines and situations warranting
cannibalization actions should be included in Squadron Mi's.
6. There should be one data source that historically
archives all Aviation Maintenance 3M data providing the same
information to all who extract the data. The current NALDA
database does not perform this function adequately. The
cannibalization trends in this database should automatically
prompt inventory management activities to update failure rates
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